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CASE COMMENTARIES 
ANTITRUST 
As the Market Evolves So Must the Laws Which Regulate Its Participants; the 
Per Se Dr. Miles Rule Is No Longer Applicable When Judging Vertical Pricing 
Policies.  Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
By Jeremy Hale  
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that vertical minimum resale price agreements 
constituted a per se violation of  the Sherman Act.  Referred to as the ―Dr. Miles 
Rule,‖ manufacturers are in violation of  the Sherman Act if  they require retailers to 
agree to minimum resale prices.  For almost a century, the Dr. Miles Rule has 
controlled in antitrust litigation; however, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc. brought this rule to its end. 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (―Leegin‖) designs, manufactures, and 
distributes leather goods.  Leegin sells women‘s fashion accessories under the 
―Brighton‖ brand name.  PSKS, Inc., doing business as Kay‘s Kloset . . . Kay‘s Shoes 
(―Kay‘s‖) is a retailer of  Leegin‘s Brighton products.  In 1997, Leegin created the 
―Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy‖ under which Leegin refused to sell 
to any retailer that discounted Brighton goods below Leegin‘s suggested prices.  
Leegin‘s justification for the new policy was based on marketing.  Leegin believed 
consumers viewed reduced-priced goods as lower quality.  To help maintain the 
exclusivity of  the Brighton brand, Leegin required the products to be sold without 
discounting. 
In 2002, Leegin learned that Kay‘s had been discounting the entire Brighton 
line of  products by twenty percent.  Kay‘s claimed it had discounted Leegin‘s goods 
to match other area retailers‘ pricing.  Leegin requested that Kay‘s cease the 
discounting, but Kay‘s refused.  As a result, Leegin stopped supplying Kay‘s with the 
Brighton products and Kay‘s suffered a pecuniary loss.  Kay‘s sued Leegin alleging a 
violation of  the antitrust laws, specifically a violation of  the Dr. Miles per se rule that 
any type of  vertical price fixing violated § 1 of  the Sherman Act. 
At trial, Kay‘s alleged that the Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy 
was price fixing.  Leegin attempted to introduce evidence of  the pro-competitive 
effects of  its policy, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of  
Texas relied on the per se Dr. Miles Rule and excluded the evidence.  The Court of  
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court‘s ruling.  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of  the United States, Leegin did not dispute that it had entered into 
vertical price-fixing agreements with retailers.  Leegin contended that a ―rule of  
reason‖ rather than a per se rule should apply to the examination of  its policy.  The 
rule of  reason would include pro-competitive justifications for the pricing policy, 
such as those excluded by the lower court.  The Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether such pricing policies should continue to be treated as a per se 
violation of  antitrust law. 
The rule of  reason is the accepted standard for determining whether a 
practice should be considered a restraint of  trade and therefore prohibited.  When a 
per se rule exists, the rule of  reason is unnecessary as the per se rule provides clear 
guidance.  However, the Court has stated that any departure from a rule of  reason 
standard must be supported by economics, not by simple line drawing. 
The Court stated, ―economics literature is replete with pro[-]competitive 
justifications for a manufacturer‘s use of  [vertical pricing policies].‖  Additionally, the 
Court found that there are numerous justifications for vertical price fixing, including 
stimulation of  inter-brand competition, facilitation of  market entry by new firms or 
brands, and encouragement of  retailer services.  According to the majority of  the 
Court, these pro-competitive effects cast doubt that a per se rule is appropriate for 
such pricing policies. 
While the Court acknowledged that vertical pricing policies have economic 
dangers, it stated that the rule of  reason was designed to eliminate only 
anticompetitive transactions.  Because there are pro-competitive effects with vertical 
pricing policies, the Court found that the rule of  reason was better suited for judging 
vertical pricing policies.  Therefore, the court overruled the per se Dr. Miles Rule and 
replaced it with the rule of  reason. 
When dealing with vertical pricing policies, the transactional attorney should 
weigh all surrounding circumstances to determine whether a practice restrains trade.  
Weight must be given to historical considerations of  the policy‘s nature and effect as 
well as to the industry and business itself.  Only upon applying the rule of  reason to 
pricing policies can the transactional attorney determine whether enough pro-
competitive effects are present to render the policy lawful. 
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ARBITRATION 
The Federal Arbitration Act Only Ensures Enforcement of  Arbitration 
Agreements to Which Both Parties Have Manifestly Agreed.  Terry Paul v. Merit 
Constr., Inc., No. E2006-00839-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 397 (Tenn. Ct. 
App.  June 27, 2007). 
By David Goodman 
The Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖) provides for the strict enforcement of  
arbitration agreements while allowing parties great flexibility in crafting the rules and 
scope of  arbitration.  The FAA preempts state statues invalidating arbitration 
agreements and provides a strong presumption of  arbitrability.   However, the FAA 
cannot be used to enforce an arbitration provision where both parties have not 
manifested their assent to be bound by its terms.   
In Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals applied an objective contracts conception of  the FAA, 
finding that automobile sales contracts were not contracts of  adhesion and, 
therefore, these sales contracts‘ arbitration provisions were enforceable under the 
FAA.  Relying on Pyburn, the appellate court in Terry Paul v. Merit Construction, Inc. held 
that where the parties only agreed to the terms of  an oral contract, the defendant 
could not fall back on the FAA to enforce arbitration provisions found in a 
subsequent written contract not signed by the plaintiffs. 
In late August 2004, Terry Paul and Alan Paul, owners of  Paul Brothers 
Construction (―Brothers Construction‖), entered into an oral contract with Merit 
Construction, Inc. (―Merit‖) to perform masonry work on the first four of  five 
sections of  a construction project.  Brothers Construction submitted weekly invoices 
for bricklaying per the terms of  the oral contract, and Merit initially made timely 
payments.   
During January 2005, however, when the parties first began to contemplate 
executing a written instrument, Merit balked at paying further invoices.  Under the 
terms of  the written instrument, Brothers Construction would be responsible for 
additional masonry work on the fifth section of  the construction project, as well as 
bound by certain arbitration provisions.  The parties reached a second verbal 
agreement to complete the fifth section, but never formally executed the written 
instrument, which Merit backdated to November 1, 2004.  Despite Merit‘s 
nonpayment, Brothers Construction continued to submit invoices and provide 
masonry work under the oral contract.  Although Merit eventually paid the invoices 
submitted in January, in early February it informed the plaintiffs that no further 
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amounts owed would be paid until the written instrument was executed.  When 
Brothers Construction again refused to provide signatures, a Merit representative 
seized and kept the instrument without comment.   
Consequently, Brothers Construction filed suit against Merit alleging breach 
of  contract.  Merit moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the 
terms of  the written instrument, pursuant to the FAA.  The trial court dismissed 
Merit‘s motion on the grounds that Brothers Construction had not signed the 
written instrument and therefore had not agreed to its arbitration provisions.  Merit 
immediately filed a notice of  appeal under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-319, which 
provides for a direct appeal from an ―order denying an application to compel 
arbitration . . . .‖  However, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s 
judgment. 
Applying Pyburn’s analysis of  the FAA under objective contracts standards, 
the appellate court in Terry Paul found several facts particularly noteworthy to the 
issue of  whether the parties mutually consented to arbitration.  First, Brothers 
Construction inserted certain requested information into the contract but never 
formally signed it, whereas Patrick O‘Hara signed the contract on behalf  of  Merit.  
The court reasoned because O‘Hara thought his signature was necessary, a 
reasonable inference arose that O‘Hara would think it was equally necessary for Alan 
Paul to sign on behalf  of  Brothers Construction.  As the court noted, Terry Paul 
stated that he purposefully did not sign the instrument because he was satisfied with 
the oral contract and did want to be bound to arbitrate.   
Second, while acknowledging that a signature is not required for the 
formation of  a binding contract, the court was further persuaded against a meeting 
of  the minds regarding arbitration because Merit presented Brothers Construction 
with the instrument after masonry work had begun and payments were due.  Merit 
never mentioned arbitration or mediation either before discussion of  a written 
contract or after it began to withhold payments.   
Third, the court disagreed with Merit‘s contention that by completing work 
on the first four sections and beginning work on the fifth section, Brothers 
Construction accepted the terms of  the written instrument.  Instead, the court 
quoted Terry Paul‘s description that Merit had put his company in a ―‗take it or leave 
it‘ position,‖ forced to continue performance under the oral contract without 
corresponding adequate assurances of  payment from Merit.  Thus, the court 
concluded that the actions provided ―nothing more than a manifestation of  their 
intent to keep working under the previous oral agreement.‖   
Pyburn and Terry Paul together clarify the scope of  enforceability for 
arbitration provisions under the FAA.  The FAA caries great force, allowing parties 
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to freely shape the terms of  arbitration, preempting state laws against such 
provisions, and creating a heavy presumption of  arbitrability where questions of  
contract formation remain unresolved.  This force, however, is delimited by 
traditional contracts principles.  In Pyburn, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals found 
that arbitration provisions in a legitimate, signed sales contract were enforceable 
under the FAA, but suggested that an opposite conclusion would follow from a 
contract of  adhesion.  Later in Terry Paul, the appellate court recognized that even an 
unsigned contract might be enforceable where the parties manifested their mutual 
assent to its terms.  Because Merit made a direct appeal rather than accepting the trial 
court‘s invitation to offer proof  of  contract formation, the appellate court found 
little reason to sustain even the strong presumption favoring arbitration.  Legal 
practitioners should recognize that the FAA does not provide for absolute 
enforcement of  every arbitration clause in the record, but instead requires some 
modicum of  proof  that the parties mutually consented to arbitrate the specific 
matter at issue. 
 
 
Court Applies Ohio Law and Finds Choice of  Law and Arbitration Provisions 
Enforceable Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Serv. Group, Inc., No. E2007-00033-COA-R3-
CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2007). 
By Amy E. Michaelson 
When a choice of  law provision specifies Ohio law as the law governing 
disputes arising from a contract, it can be difficult to determine at which point a 
Tennessee court should begin to apply Ohio‘s law.  Should Ohio law govern what law 
to apply to disputes arising under the contract, or should it apply directly to the 
disputes arising under the contract?  This was the issue in Credit General Insurance Co. 
v. Insurance Service Group, Inc., which held that Ohio law applied to determine which 
source of  law should govern the parties‘ dispute.   
Credit General Insurance Company involves an October 1998 agreement (the 
―Agreement‖) between Credit General Insurance Company (―Credit General‖) and 
Insurance Service Group, Inc. (―ISG‖).  Under the terms of  the Agreement, ISG 
promised to pay Credit General specified premiums and commissions in exchange 
for becoming the ―agents/brokers in the underwriting, sale, and/or servicing of  
[Credit General‘s] insurance policies . . . .‖  The parties also agreed that Ohio law 
would govern the ―performance, administration, and interpretation‖ of  the 
Agreement and that disputes between the parties would be resolved by arbitration.   
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Credit General became insolvent and was placed in liquidation in early 2001.  
An Ohio court appointed a liquidator to ―collect and administer all of  Credit 
General‘s assets.‖  Shortly after the liquidator‘s appointment, Credit General filed a 
lawsuit in the Chancery Court of  Anderson County, Tennessee, against ISG, the sole 
shareholder of  ISG, Appalachian Underwriters Inc (AUI), and the officers of  ISG 
and AUI.  In its complaint, Credit General alleged that ISG and AUI breached the 
Agreement by ―failing to refund premiums and unearned commissions due Credit 
General‖ and raised claims of  conversion and breach of  fiduciary duty against the 
officers of  ISG and AUI.   
In the trial court, the defendants collectively moved the court to require 
arbitration pursuant to the Agreement‘s arbitration provision.  The trial court granted 
the defendants‘ motion. The court, however, also granted Credit General permission 
to file an interlocutory appeal and stayed the arbitration pending the outcome of  the 
appeal.  The defendants also appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting 
Credit General permission to file the interlocutory appeal and staying the arbitration.  
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals consolidated both appeals and held: (1) pursuant to 
the Agreement, Ohio law applied to the dispute; (2) pursuant to Ohio law, Tennessee 
law applied to determine the enforceability of  the arbitration provision; and (3) 
under Tennessee law, the arbitration provision was enforceable. 
To determine whether the arbitration provision was enforceable, the court 
first had to determine whether Ohio law applied to the question of  enforceability or 
merely to the question of  which law to apply to the question of  enforceability.  
Ordinarily, the court would apply Ohio law directly to the question of  enforceability, 
consistent with the parties‘ choice of  law provision.  However, Ohio case law 
unequivocally states that the issue of  whether a dispute must be arbitrated is 
procedural in nature and, therefore, must ―be decided pursuant to the law of  the 
forum state.‖  As a result, the court held that Ohio law required the application of  
Tennessee law to determine the enforceability of  the arbitration provision. 
Next, the court considered whether the arbitration agreement was 
enforceable under Tennessee law.  Tennessee case law demonstrates Tennessee 
courts‘ respect for arbitration provisions.  However, a Tennessee court will invalidate 
an arbitration provision when considerations of  ―laches, estoppel, waiver, fraud, 
duress, and unconscionability‖ (the ―exceptions‖) render the provision 
unenforceable.  In this case, the court was persuaded by Tennessee‘s position 
favoring arbitration provisions and found no basis to invoke the exceptions.  Finding 
no error on behalf  of  the trial court, the appellate court affirmed and remanded the 
case for arbitration. 
The significance of  this case is that it evidences Tennessee courts‘ emphasis 
on enforcing contracts as written.  The court followed the parties‘ agreement to the 
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letter, but neglected the parties‘ likely intentions for Ohio law to govern all aspects 
of  any disputes arising under the contract.  Thus, this case diminishes the 
effectiveness of  choice of  law provisions in Tennessee courts.  To avoid 
unpredictability of  applying a state‘s common law, transactional attorneys include 
choice of  law provisions to ensure a particular state‘s law applies.  To circumvent the 
problem encountered in Credit General Insurance Co., transactional attorneys should 
draft choice of  law provisions that specify a source of  law to govern both 
substantive and procedural aspects of  disputes.  For additional protection, Tennessee 
practitioners should also consider drafting choice of  venue provisions, which can 
keep parties out of  Tennessee courts altogether.   
 
 
The Effect of  Arbitration Clauses on Claims for Tortious Interference with 
Other Contracts.  Bodor v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. M2007-00308-COA-R10-
CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2007). 
By Aaron J. Kandel 
Occasionally, the scope of  an arbitration clause is called into question.  Can a 
broad arbitration clause in one contract require the parties to arbitrate claims for a 
tortious interference claim?  The Tennessee Court of  Appeals recently addressed this 
issue in Bodor v. Green Tree Servicing. 
Bodor entered into a series of  identical, fill-in-the-blank form financing 
agreements with Green Tree Servicing (―Green Tree‖), a financing corporation.  
Under the terms of  these financing agreements, Bodor gave Green Tree Servicing a 
security interest in fifteen mobile homes that he leased to tenants.  Each financing 
agreement contained an identical arbitration clause stating that ―the parties agreed to 
arbitrate ‗[a]ll disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to [the] 
Contract or the relationships which result from [the] contract.‘‖  
On June 23, 2003, Green Tree Servicing, ―in the apparent belief  that Bodor 
was in default under the financing [agreements]‖, presented twenty four of  Bodor‘s 
tenants with written notice to vacate the mobile homes.  In response, Bodor filed suit 
alleging that Green Tree Servicing ―unlawfully induced his tenants to breach their 
leases by effectively instructing the tenants to vacate their units and quit paying their 
rent‖ in violation of  Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-50-109. 
On October 16, 2006, Green Tree Servicing moved to compel arbitration 
under the financing agreements‘ arbitration clauses.  However, Bodor successfully 
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resisted the motion to compel by arguing that his tortious interference action against 
Green Tree Servicing arose out of  the leases with his tenants, not the financing 
agreements.  On appeal, the sole issue before the court was ―whether the allegations 
of  tortious conduct by [Green Tree Servicing fell] within the scope of  the arbitration 
clause[s]‖ contained in the financing agreements.   
The court held that the arbitration clauses covered Bodor‘s tortious 
interference claim regarding the fifteen mobile homes for three reasons.  First, 
Tennessee courts recognize a ―heavy presumption of  arbitrability‖ which requires a 
court to resolve questions regarding the scope of  an arbitration clause in favor of  
arbitration.  Second, under the plain language of  the arbitration clause, Bodor‘s 
tortious interference claim ―[arose] from or relate[d] to the financing agreement or 
the relationships created by those agreements.‖  Specifically, the court noted that 
Green Tree Servicing ―took the action [it] did because of  the perceived default under 
the financing [agreements] that contain the arbitration clauses.‖  Finally, the court 
concluded that the fact that Bodor‘s claim ―sounds in tort rather than contract does 
not remove [it] from the ambit of  the arbitration clause.‖  Thus, the court ordered 
arbitration of  Bodor‘s claim arising out of  the fifteen mobile homes covered by the 
financing agreements.    
Although parties ―cannot be forced to arbitrate claims that they did not agree 
to arbitrate‖, Bodor illustrates that Tennessee courts recognize a heavy presumption 
favoring arbitration.  Thus, a transactional attorney ought to advise clients that they 
may be required to arbitrate a wide variety of  claims, including claims for tortious 
interference with other contracts.   
 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Loan from Trustee to Beneficiary, Secured with Beneficiary’s Future 
Distributions from the Testamentary Trust, Survives Chapter 7 Challenge.  
Warren v. Sec. Nat’l Bank (In re Oelrich), No. 07-8002, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2961 (B.A.P. 
6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007). 
By Chad Jarboe 
Absent explicit language to the contrary, Ohio courts interpret testamentary 
trusts in favor of  free alienation.  In In re Oelrich, the United States Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit, interpreting Ohio law, considered whether a 
beneficiary/debtor could grant a trustee a security interest in future distributions 
under the trust in order to obtain a loan.  The court denied the chapter 7 trustee‘s 
objection to the loan because no language in the trust explicitly restricted the 
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beneficiary‘s right to transfer his interest and the loan did not involve any coercion or 
fraud on the part of  the trustee. 
Melvin Oelrich (the ―Testator‖) executed a will establishing a testamentary 
trust for the benefit of  his two children.  The trust named Security National Bank 
and Trust Company (the ―Bank‖) as the trustee.  Under the trust, the Bank must 
make monthly distributions, at a predetermined amount, to the children for a period 
of  twenty years, at which time the trust funds would be exhausted.  If  both children 
died before the twenty years elapsed, the remaining distributions went to a 
contingent beneficiary.  The trust provided for no additional distributions.  
Furthermore, the trust granted the Bank broad powers to handle the property ―fully 
and freely as if  it were the absolute owner of  the same.‖  The trust did not contain 
any specific anti-alienation language or a spendthrift provision.   
Subsequently, one of  the children, Steven Oelrich (―Oelrich‖), obtained, and 
later refinanced, a loan from the Bank. Oelrich also granted the Bank a security 
interest in his future distributions under the trust.  Several years later, Oelrich filed a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.  Consequently, the Bank filed a motion for relief  from 
the automatic stay to enforce the security interest in Oelrich‘s future cash 
distributions. 
Thereafter, James Warren (―Warren‖), the chapter 7 trustee, challenged the 
validity of  the Bank‘s security interest.  Warren argued that the security interest was 
invalid because the trust did not authorize a beneficiary to grant or the trustee to 
accept a security interest.  Further, Warren claimed that the Bank violated its 
fiduciary duty as trustee because it personally benefited from the transaction, thereby 
rendering the security interest invalid.  The bankruptcy court summarily denied 
Warren‘s objections and rejected both of  his arguments.  Warren appealed the ruling, 
and the bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. 
Warren‘s first argument, that the security interests are not authorized by the 
trust‘s terms or the testator‘s intent, is essentially a question of  interpretation.  Under 
Ohio law, the intent of  the testator controls.  If  the trust‘s language is unambiguous, 
the court must honor the trust‘s terms as written.  Additionally, courts will not 
interpret a trust to restrain the alienability of  the beneficiary‘s interest unless the 
testator manifested such intent in clear, unequivocal language.  This trust did not 
expressly impose any restrictions on the beneficiaries‘ interests.  The trust merely 
provided for periodic distributions, with the only contingency being that the children 
were alive.  Thus, the appellate panel found that the children‘s interests were freely 
alienable.  Consequently, Oelrich was free to transfer his future distributions to the 
Bank as collateral for the loan.  
Furthermore, the transaction did not upset the Testator‘s intent to 
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periodically distribute funds over a twenty-year period.  Although Oelrich benefited 
from the distributions in advance by using his future distributions as collateral to 
obtain a loan, he could have achieved the same result by using different collateral.  In 
addition, the monthly trust distributions were still to be dispersed in the 
predetermined amounts as the Testator intended; the only difference was that the 
Bank became the indirect recipient.  Thus, the appellate panel found the Bank‘s lien 
permissible under the trust‘s terms and consistent with the Testator‘s intent. 
Warren‘s second argument, that the Bank breached its fiduciary duties as 
trustee by accepting a security interest in the trust distributions, also failed to 
persuade the appellate panel.  Given its ruling that the beneficiaries‘ interests are 
freely alienable, the appellate panel found that by accepting the security interest, the 
Bank simply recognized Oelrich‘s right to voluntarily transfer his interest.   
However, the loan raised some fiduciary concerns.  Generally, a trustee is not 
permitted to use its position to its advantage, nor may it have any self-interest that 
might conflict with its duties as trustee.  First, the Bank personally benefited from 
the transaction with Oelrich by charging interest on the loan.  Yet, The appellate 
panel found that the Bank did not use its position improperly because no evidence 
suggested that the Bank coerced Oelrich to choose it over another lender.    
Second, the Bank had a potential conflict of  interest due to its stake in the 
trust fund distributions.  Under Ohio law, a potential conflict is not per se invalid.  
Because the Bank did not act in bad faith and Oelrich was not misinformed or 
prejudiced by the transaction, the potential conflict did not invalidate the transaction.  
Finally, the Bank‘s security interest only encumbered Oelrich‘s future interest in trust 
distributions, not the entire corpus of  the trust.  
Although the appellate panel rejected the chapter 7 trustee‘s challenges, In re 
Oelrich warns transactional attorneys of  the consequences of  poor drafting and the 
disruptive effects of  bankruptcy on even the simplest testamentary trust.  First, 
estate planners must understand their state‘s common law and interpretative rules, 
and should draft documents with sufficient precision and clarity to avoid triggering 
default rules, which might render an unwanted outcome.  If  the Testator did not 
want his children to use their trust distributions as collateral for loans, his attorney‘s 
drafting was flawed.  Although no evidence suggests this was the Testator‘s intent, 
many clients may desire such a result, especially if  the client does not believe the 
beneficiaries are responsible investors.  Second, bankruptcy must be properly 
considered during estate planning.  To avoid uncertainty, and the cost of  challenging 
any pre-bankruptcy transactions, the parties must carefully account for the real 
possibility of  bankruptcy in their testamentary documents.  With proper drafting and 
fair consideration of  bankruptcy‘s unique impact on testamentary documents, the 
prudent transactional attorney may avoid challenges to the documents, altogether.  
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A Personal Injury Claim that is Filed Before a Chapter 11 Petition for Relief  is 
a “Prepetition” Claim Against Which a Landlord/Creditor Can Setoff  Its 
Own Prepetition Claim on Judgment for Breach of  Lease.  In re Gregg, 371 B.R. 
817 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007).  
By Kacy Hunt 
Once a debtor files for protection under chapter 11 of  the Bankruptcy Code 
(―chapter 11‖), an automatic stay is instituted which prevents a creditor from setting 
off  any debt owed by the creditor to the debtor against a claim the creditor has 
against the debtor.  A creditor may, however, apply for relief  from the automatic stay 
in order to set off  the debt from the claim.  To exercise the right of  setoff, the 
creditor must owe a debt to the debtor, that creditor must have a claim against the 
debtor, both the debt owed by the creditor and the creditor‘s claim against the debtor 
must have arisen prepetition, and the debt and claim must be mutual obligations.     
In In re Gregg, before the debtor, Gregg, filed for relief  under chapter 11, two 
events transpired.  First, the creditor, Southern Adventist University (―SAU‖), 
obtained a judgment against Gregg for breach of  a lease and recorded the judgment 
in Hamilton County.  Second, Gregg brought a claim against SAU in a personal 
injury lawsuit for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on property owned by 
SAU.  At the time Gregg filed for relief  under chapter 11, the personal injury lawsuit 
was pending in the Circuit Court of  Hamilton County and the amount of  damages 
sought by Gregg was unknown. 
When Gregg filed for chapter 11, SAU filed a proof  of  claim for the amount 
of  the recorded judgment plus post-judgment interest.  SAU then filed for relief  
from the automatic stay in order to setoff  any monetary judgment that Gregg might 
be awarded in the pending personal injury case against the judgment lien amount set 
forth in SAU‘s proof  of  claim.  In order to exercise the right of  setoff, the 
Bankruptcy Code requires four elements to be met:  (1) the creditor must owe debt 
to the debtor; (2) the creditor must have a claim against the debtor; (3) both the debt 
and the claim must arise before the filing for relief  (―timing‖); and (4) the debt and 
claim must be mutual obligations (―mutuality‖). 
First, the creditor owed a debt to the debtor.  The Bankruptcy Code defines 
―debt‖ as a ―liability on a claim.‖  SAU has a liability on Gregg‘s claim against them 
for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell on property owned by SAU.  Second, 
the creditor had a claim against the debtor.  The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as 
a ―right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured or unsecured.‖  Applying this definition, SAU had a right to 
payment from Gregg for the amount of  the judgment and post-judgment interest, 
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and this claim was properly presented by SAU in a proof  of  claim.   
The two elements of  setoff  that were at issue in In re Gregg were timing and 
mutuality.  Regarding timing, while SAU‘s claim against Gregg was undoubtedly 
prepetition, as the cause of  action giving rise to the claim and the judgment arose 
before Gregg filed for chapter 11 relief, Gregg claimed that the damages from her 
personal injury lawsuit should be considered postpetition because the damages 
would have to be determined after the filing for relief.  However, the court disagreed 
with Gregg and stated that the pivotal point in time in determining whether a claim 
is pre or postpetition is when the cause of  action giving rise to the claim arose, not 
the awarding of  damages.  Since Gregg slipped and fell before the petition for relief  
was filed, her claim was prepetition.  Therefore, both the debt owed to Gregg by 
SAU and the claim by SAU against Gregg arose prepetition and the timing element 
of  setoff  was met.  
While mutuality is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, Tennessee 
bankruptcy courts have held that ―[m]utuality of  obligations means that the 
obligations must be between the same parties, . . . and must be ‗owing to and due in 
the same rights and capacity.‘‖  Both the debt and the claim were between SAU and 
Gregg; therefore, the obligations were between the same parties.  Obligations do not 
have to arise from the same transaction nor even be of  the same character to be 
considered ―owing to and due in the same rights and capacity.‖  In other words, a 
tort claim can be setoff  against a contract claim even when the claims arose from 
different causes of  action.  Therefore, mutuality existed and all elements of  setoff  
were met.   
The decision in In re Gregg furthers the broad scope of  setoff  that a 
bankruptcy court will allow.  A creditor may set off  any prepetition debt owed to the 
debtor against a prepetition claim of  the creditor against the debtor as long as there 
is mutuality between the two.  With such a broad interpretation of  ―mutuality,‖ the 
scope of  setoff  is large and aids creditors in obtaining relief  from the automatic stay 
imposed by a bankruptcy filing. 
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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Related Business Entities Operating Under Separate Governing Documents 
May Not Be Related for Purposes of  Satisfying Financial Obligations. 
Bradshaw v. Chattanooga Railcar Serv., No. E2005-02728-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007). 
By Scott Simmons 
Two separate companies that are owned by the same majority shareholder 
and share nearly identical operating agreements may not be ―lumped‖ together for 
purposes of  analyzing cash distributions to shareholders.  Each company must abide 
by the terms of  its operating agreement in making payments to shareholders to cover 
tax liability incurred on company profits and cannot rely on payments made by 
another company with the same majority shareholder.   
In Bradshaw v. Chattanooga Railcar Services, Bradshaw was a shareholder in two 
companies, Chattanooga Railcar Services (―CRS‖) and Kingsport Railcar Services 
(―KRS‖) (collectively, the ―Defendants‖).  As a charter member of  these companies, 
Bradshaw claimed he was eligible under the terms of  each company‘s operating 
agreement to receive a shareholder distribution sufficient to pay his tax liability 
incurred as a result of  undistributed profits from both companies.  He asserted that 
because no payments were made by either company to cover his liability, 
disbursements to other shareholders were in direct opposition to the operating 
agreements. 
The operating agreements of  both companies are identical in structure, and 
read in pertinent part, that:  
Distributable Cash means . . . all funds of  the Company on hand . . . 
that, in the discretion of  the Chief  Manager, is available for 
distribution to the Members after provisions [have] been made for . . 
. an amount sufficient to pay any Federal or state taxes assessed on 
Company income taxable to the Members . . . even if  the Company 
must borrow the money to make such payments.   
Bradshaw referenced this provision in each operating agreement and argued that he 
had not received payments to cover his tax liabilities despite the fact that 
disbursements were made to other sharholders.  The trial court found that Bradshaw 
had received sufficient amounts from KRS to cover his tax liabilities during the years 
in question, but had not received any payments from CRS.  The trial court ―lumped‖ 
the two companies into one entity, and found that the payments distributed to 
Bradshaw by KRS ―were sufficient to enable him to pay the taxes due on his share‖ 
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of  the income from both KRS and CRS.   
On appeal, Bradshaw averred that the trial court misinterpreted the scope 
and span of  the two companies‘ operating agreements.  Citing Doe v. HCA Health 
Services of  Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
determined that interpretation of  such agreements is a question of  law and thus 
subject to de novo review.   
Upon review, the court upheld the trial court‘s determination that the 
language within the respective operating agreements was not ambiguous, noting that 
―the agreements plainly state[d] that provisions must be made for ‗an amount 
sufficient to pay any Federal or state taxes assessed on Company income taxable to 
the Members,‘ before any additional distributions can be made.‖  With respect to the 
payments received from KRS, Bradshaw argued that the distributions were not 
specifically designated as amounts paid for the purpose of  covering his income tax 
liability.  However, the court, unpersuaded by this line of  reasoning, affirmed the 
lower court‘s holding that the amounts paid by KRS to Bradshaw were sufficient to 
pay his taxes. 
As to CRS, the appellate court found the trial court erred in treating the two 
companies as an aggregate, single company.  The court held that CRS was a 
―completely separate entity from KRS.‖  As such, CRS made no distributions to 
Bradshw in 2000 or 2001, despite making such payments to other shareholders.  In 
accordance with the plain language of  the operating agreement, Bradshaw was owed 
a distribution from CRS in the amount necessary to pay his tax liability from income 
attributed to the company.  The issue of  the amount of  Bradshaw‘s tax liability from 
2000-2001 for income attributable to CRS was remanded to the trial court for 
determination. 
As Bradshaw distinctly demonstrates, the fact that more than one company 
contains the same majority owner does not mean that the two firms may be treated 
as a single, aggregate entity for purposes of  determining company distributions 
related to tax liability of  the shareholder.  When the terms of  separate operating 
agreements are unambiguous, each agreement should be treated as a separate 
governing document, even when they are identical in both form and content and 
each company is under the control of  the same majority shareholder.       
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The Tennessee Banking Act Does Not Mandate the Sale of  Trust Assets to a 
State or Federal Bank of  the FDIC; Trust Assets may be Sold to Any Outside 
Party.  In re Sentinel Trust (Sentinel II), No. M2006-01002-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2007). 
By J. Scott Childs 
When the Tennessee Commissioner of  Financial Institutions 
(―Commissioner‖) liquidates an insolvent trust company, questions arise as to which 
outside parties the Commissioner can legally sell the trust company‘s assets with 
court approval.  In Sentinel II, a legal dispute arose regarding whether the 
Commissioner had the authority to sell seized real estate that was formerly owned by 
a trust company to a party other than another state or national bank or the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (―FDIC‖).   
In April 1999, the Tennessee Banking Act (the ―Banking Act‖) was amended 
to extend its application to trust companies.  Later that year, the Commissioner 
commenced a formal investigation of  the Sentinel Trust Company (―Sentinel‖) into 
its business practices and financial situation to ensure compliance with the Banking 
Act.  After a series of  annual investigations, numerous violations of  the Banking Act 
were uncovered in 2004.  A commissioner-appointed receiver determined that 
Sentinel was insolvent by at least $6.2 million.  Subsequently, the Commissioner 
determined that liquidation was necessary and appropriate, and several former 
officers and directors of  Sentinel (―Officers‖) filed a petition seeking judicial review 
of  the Commissioner‘s decision.  The trial court upheld the Commissioner‘s actions 
of  taking control of  Sentinel and its property.  The Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
upheld this determination in Sentinel I. 
Following Sentinel I, the Commissioner proceeded with his efforts to 
complete the liquidation of  Sentinel.  The primary asset at issue was the real estate 
and office building that formerly housed Sentinel‘s headquarters, a property that cost 
Sentinel $1.1 million to acquire and develop.  In 2006, the Commissioner-appointed 
receiver entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the property in the amount 
of  $450,000 with Robert and Aieyoung Allen, a married couple from Florida.  When 
the Commissioner filed a Motion for Approval of  Sale with the trial court, the 
Officers filed a petition objecting to the Motion.  The trial court granted the 
Commissioner‘s Motion and the Officers‘ appealed. 
According to section 1502 of  the Banking Act, as amended in 1999, the 
Commissioner has broad authority to manage the affairs of  an insolvent trust 
company over which he has properly taken possession.  This power allowed the 
Commissioner to reorganize or liquidate Sentinel in accordance with section 1504.  
Section 1502 further provides that the Commissioner may, with approval of  the 
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appropriate court, sell all or part of  the assets of  the insolvent trust company to a 
state or national bank or the FDIC.  The Officers relied on this provision in 
challenging the sale of  the Sentinel property to the Allens.  The Officers argued that 
section 1502 restricts the Commissioner to selling such property to either a state or 
national bank or the FDIC. 
The court rejected the Officers‘ argument on two grounds.  First, section 
1502 was merely permissive in tone rather than mandatory.  Section 1502 states that 
the Commissioner ―may‖ liquidate assets by selling them to a bank or the FDIC.  
Second, section 1502 allowed the Commissioner to liquidate seized trust company 
assets in accordance with section 1504.  Under section 1504, the Commissioner may 
sell any trust company asset having a value in excess of  $500 so long as he first 
obtains court approval.  The statute contained no limitation on the Commissioner 
regarding what categories of  parties could legally purchase such assets.  Therefore, 
the court, reading sections 1502 and 1504 together, reasoned that, because the 
Commissioner had proper court approval, he could sell the Sentinel property to the 
Allens, a private third party. 
This case clarifies the Commissioner‘s power to liquidate insolvent trust 
companies.  With court approval, the Commissioner can sell a seized trust company 
asset exceeding $500 in value to any outside party.  The Banking Act has only applied 
to trust companies since 1999, but it has applied to banks from its inception.  Thus, 
the Commissioner‘s liquidation powers as articulated in Sentinel II also apply to 
insolvent banks.  When representing a bank or trust company under investigation by 
the Commissioner, it is important to understand the Commissioner‘s wide latitude in 
finding potential purchasers of  a seized asset, often at a heavily discounted price 
from what the asset was originally worth. 
 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW 
Uniform Commercial Code Requires the Sending of  But Not Necessarily the 
Receipt of  Notification Prior to Disposition of  Collateral.  Auto Credit of  
Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2007). 
By Melanie McDavid Lamb 
While the Uniform Commercial Code (―UCC‖) requires creditors to provide 
notification to the debtor, any secondary obligors, and other interested parties prior 
to the disposition of  collateral, there was still some uncertainty as to whether 
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creditors were required to take additional steps to determine whether that 
notification has been received.  Previous decisions requiring creditors to take 
additional action to verify that notice was actually received were overruled by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in Auto Credit of  Nashville v. Wimmer. 
In Wimmer, Wimmer borrowed money from Auto Credit of  Nashville (―Auto 
Credit‖) to finance the purchase of  a car, which served as security for the loan.  
Wimmer subsequently defaulted on this loan and surrendered the car to Auto Credit.  
Auto Credit mailed Wimmer a letter regarding the disposition of  the collateral via 
certified mail return receipt requested.  However, Wimmer never received the 
notification letter, which was returned to Auto Credit after three unsuccessful 
attempts at delivery. 
On February 7, 2002, Auto Credit sold the collateral and subsequently filed 
suit against Wimmer to recover a deficiency balance.  A judgment was entered in 
favor of  Wimmer and Auto Credit appealed.  Wimmer counterclaimed for damages 
on the theory that Auto Credit failed to comply with mandatory notification 
requirements under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-625(c)(2), Tennessee‘s version of  the 
UCC.  The circuit court found Auto Credit‘s notification to be reasonable and held 
that the sale was proper.  Auto Credit was granted a deficiency judgment against 
Wimmer. 
Wimmer appealed to address, not the deficiency judgment itself, but his 
counterclaim for statutory damages that the trial court dismissed.  The court of  
appeals reversed the lower court and awarded Wimmer statutory damages, which 
were offset by the deficiency judgment previously awarded to Auto Credit. 
Auto Credit appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which addressed the 
requirements for ―sending‖ reasonable notification under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-
611(b).  The term ―send‖ is explicitly defined in Article 9 of  Tennessee‘s UCC as ―to 
deposit in the mail . . . with postage or cost of  transmission provided for, addressed 
to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or to cause the record of  
notification to be received within the time it would have been received if  properly 
sent . . . .‖  This definition is consistent with the plain meaning of  the word ―send.‖  
Receipt of  notice is not discussed in the statutory provision requiring 
notification.  However, the introductory provisions of  the UCC state that ―[w]hen 
the essential fact is the other party‘s receipt of  the notice, that is stated.‖  In addition, 
Tennessee law presumes that mail was received ―upon proof  that the letter was 
properly addressed, properly stamped, and duly deposited with the post office.‖  
The Court analyzed three possibilities that may arise prior to disposition of  
the collateral.  First, a creditor sends no notification and proceeds to sell the 
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collateral in clear violation of  the statute.  Second, a creditor sends notification 
pursuant to the statute, knows this notice was received, and conducts a valid sale of  
the collateral.  Third, a creditor sends notification, learns that such notification was 
not received, and proceeds to sell the collateral without attempting to locate the 
debtor.  In Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1966), the court of  appeals held that it was not reasonable to proceed with the sale 
without making an additional attempt to provide notification. 
In Wimmer, the creditor sent notification as outlined in the statute, but did 
not know whether that notification was received prior to conducting the sale.  
Applying the plain meaning of  the statutory language, the court concluded that the 
UCC does not require the creditor to take additional steps to determine whether 
notification was received.  The Court reasoned that requiring creditors to take an 
additional step to verify receipt of  the notification in each and every case would 
place an unreasonable burden on the creditor and would ―make secured transactions 
in this state unduly cumbersome.‖  There are numerous reasons why debtors do not 
receive notification, including change of  address and lost or misplaced mail.  In 
addition, many debtors may refuse delivery of  the notification, causing the creditor 
further delay. 
The court‘s decision is fair for both creditors and debtors.  It gives creditors 
the right to sell collateral for which they bargained when entering into the secured 
transaction.  On the other hand, this decision protects the debtor by leaving in place 
the holding in Mallicoat which requires creditors to take additional steps to provide 
notice to the debtor only when the creditor has actual knowledge that its notification 
was not received. 
 
 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
Written Corporate Policy:  A Company’s Worst Enemy? Vehar v. Cole Nat’l Group, 
Inc., No. 06-4542, 2007 WL 3129713 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2007). 
By Jonathan Louis May 
Attorneys in the corporate realm are often responsible for drafting and 
maintaining written policies for their clients.  Included in many of  these policies are 
carefully crafted job qualifications and descriptions.  Problems arise, however, when 
the corporate decision-makers do not abide by the written policy.  When this occurs, 
the policy is often turned against the company and makes for damning evidence.  
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Such was the case in Vehar v. Cole National Group, Inc. 
In Vehar, Wendy Vehar, a former female employee of  Cole Vision 
Corporation (―Cole‖) brought suit under the Federal and Ohio Eequal Pay Act 
(―EPA‖).  Vehar began working for Cole after an eight-year hiatus from computer 
programming.  Vehar had Bachelor‘s Degrees in mathematics and computer science, 
nearly seven years of  work experience, and took a number of  courses designed to 
ensure that her education was up to date with the level of  current technology.  She 
was hired in February of  2001 as a ―Data Analyst,‖ a position her manager said she 
was ―over qualified‖ to do, which had a salary of  $46,000.  In June of  the following 
year she was transferred to a different section of  Cole and promised the title of  
―Programmer Analyst.‖  Instead, Vehar was placed in the lower position of  
―Programmer II‖ and received a salary of  $46,400, representing a one percent raise.  
During her time at Cole she received an ―E‖ or ―exceeds expectations‖ on her 
performance reviews and management viewed her as a leader and capable of  making 
a difference.  Wehn Vehar left Cole in November 2004, she was earning $48,783, 
$25,000 less than she was paid when she found new employment.  
In contrast, Erich Leipold and Dave Crosley worked in the same division of  
Cole and were paid substantially more money.  Leipold, who had no college degree 
and nine years of  experience in the field, was hired by Cole in 2000 and earned 
$60,000 as a ―Program Analyst.‖  Crosley, who also had no college degree and eight 
years of  experience, was hired by Cole in 2000 and earned $68,500 as a ―Systems 
Analyst.‖  Both Leipold and Crosley received ―M‖ or ―meets expectations‖ 
performance reviews, yet continued to advance in title and salary during their time at 
Cole.   When Leipold and Crosley left the company, they were earning $78,622 and 
$73,733, respectively, twenty percent more than Vehar.   
The duties held by these three employees were nearly identical despite the 
difference in pay and title.  All three were programmers in the same division of  the 
company, reported to the same manager, and took essentially the same assignments.  
The three programmers often worked together, and on a number of  occasions Vehar 
was designated as the team leader with the other two employees reporting to her.  
Vehar complained to the management of  Cole about the pay discrepancies, but was 
told she would not be given a raise.  At trial, however, Cole claimed that the pay 
discrepancy arose from a difference in experience levels, thus Leipold and Crosley 
were paid more because they had more experience.   
To state a claim under the EPA a plaintiff  must make a prima facie showing 
that an employer pays different wages to employees of  opposite sexes for equal work 
on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility and performed under similar 
working conditions.  If  an employee establishes a prima facie case, the EPA provides 
four affirmative defenses an employer may use to explain the discrepancy.  The four 
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defenses are: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system that measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of  production; or (4) that any factor other than sex 
was behind the discrepancy.  The fourth ―catch-all‖ provision has left courts with 
little guidance about how to evaluate the affirmative defense.   
Vehar filed suit under the Federal and Ohio EPA, as well as Title VII of  the 
Civil Rights Act of  1964 and the corresponding Ohio Civil code.  The district court 
granted Cole‘s motion for summary judgment holding that Cole met the ―catch-all‖ 
affirmative defense.  On appeal, Vehar challenged the holding on the basis that a 
reasonable jury could have found that sex played a role in determining Vehar‘s wages.   
The Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court‘s grant of  summary judgment on 
the basis that Cole failed to meet its heavy burden under the catch-all affirmative 
defense.  Cole was hoisted by its own petard, however, when the court compared the 
job descriptions, their listed salary grade, and the experience of  each employee.  The 
job descriptions indicated that the positions required a Bachelor‘s degree or 
equivalent work experience typically achieved with five, seven, or ten plus years of  
work experience, depending on the salary of  the position.  The relative similarity in 
job experience (almost seven years for Vehar, compared to eight and nine years for 
Leipold and Crosley, respectively) and the fact that Vehar was the only one of  the 
three with a Bachelor‘s degree greatly discredited Cole‘s claim that experience caused 
the twenty percent pay discrepancy. 
Further, Cole‘s policies and job qualifications left it unclear whether a 
Bachelor‘s degree is interchangeable with work experience and did not clarify the 
value of  having both.  The job descriptions used ―or‖ rather than ―and‖ in 
describing the qualifications, which meant the combination of  experience and a 
college degree could make Vehar the more qualified and experienced candidate.  
Considering the exemplary performance reviews Vehar received in contrast to the 
mediocre reviews received by Leipold and Crosley, it was clear that a reasonable jury 
could find for Vehar on her EPA claim.   
Standards emerged that applied to all employers, which proved particularly 
incriminating for Cole.  First, regardless of  the title an employee holds, courts will 
evaluate the relative equivalence of  each employee‘s job on a case-by-case basis by 
focusing on the duties, responsibilities, and requirements of  each position.  Only 
after such individualized inquiry can a court determine whether the job held by a 
female employee deserves similar compensation as the male employee with which it 
is being compared.  Second, a company‘s own policy and guidelines will be used to 
measure whether a plaintiff  was qualified for the position sought or for a position 
that is substantially the same but receiving a higher salary.  Lastly, the ―catch-all‖ 
affirmative defense places a heavy burden on the defendant to demonstrate that a 
legitimate business reason—not sex—led to the pay discrepancy.  If  a defendant fails 
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to meet that burden, not only is summary judgment improper, but the defendant will 
likely lose before a jury. 
It is with these lessons in mind that an attorney charged with drafting 
corporate hiring guidelines, overseeing compliance with those guidelines, or 
evaluating the liabilities of  the company must operate.  Only through responsible 
policy writing, employee education, and diligent oversight can an employer and its 
counsel hope to avoid expensive and timely employment discrimination litigation.  
 
 
A Possible Policy-based Exception to the At-will Employment Doctrine in 
Tennessee and the Framework for Applying Such an Exception.  Little v. 
Eastgate of  Jackson, LLC, No. W2006-01846-COA-R9-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
242 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2007). 
By Brad Hearne 
In Little v. Eastgate of  Jackson, LLC, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
considered, on interlocutory appeal, the issue of  whether the plaintiff-employee‘s 
complaint stated a claim for retaliatory discharge in violation of  a clear public policy.  
The employee was terminated because he had left the work premises to aid an assault 
victim.  The court held that there was a clearly mandated public policy in favor of  
such behavior and that this public policy may be the basis for an exception to the at-
will employment doctrine.  The court proceeded to adopt a framework for applying 
such policy-based exceptions.  This framework required the employee to prove: (1) 
that the clear public policy exists; (2) that discouraging the conduct in which the 
plaintiff  engaged would jeopardize the public policy; and (3) that the public-policy-
linked conduct in fact caused the dismissal.  Additionally, as part of  the analysis, the 
employer was permitted to assert the defense of  an ―overriding justification‖ for 
termination. 
In Little, the plaintiff  was an at-will employee of  a store doing business as 
Eastgate Discount Beer and Tobacco.  While at work, Little witnessed a woman 
across the street from the store being physically assaulted by an unidentified man.  
The employee took a baseball bat from under the work counter, left the work 
premises, and yelled and gestured at the assailant with the bat, causing him to leave 
the scene.  The employee then brought the woman back to the store, where he called 
the police.  Two days later, the defendant-store terminated the employee because he 
left the work premises to aid the assault victim.  He then sued his employer, asserting 
that his termination violated public policy.  The employer filed a motion to dismiss 
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the complaint, arguing that the termination did not violate a clearly established public 
policy.  The trial court found that the employee‘s complaint stated a valid claim for 
retaliatory discharge and denied the motion to dismiss.  The employer filed an 
interlocutory appeal. 
Tennessee has long adhered to the employment-at-will doctrine.  However, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that an employer‘s ability to discharge 
at-will employees is tempered by the court‘s recognition of  a cause of  action for 
retaliatory discharge.  In general, an at-will employee may not be discharged for any 
reason that violates a clear public policy that is evidenced by an unambiguous 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. 
Prior to Little, Tennessee courts addressed retaliatory discharge claims in 
different contexts, but there were no decisions addressing the viability of  such a 
claim under circumstances similar to this case.  Therefore, the court turned to 
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996), a factually similar case decided 
by the Washington Supreme Court.  In determining whether to recognize a policy-
based exception to the at-will doctrine, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals adopted the 
framework set forth in Gardner and shown above. 
To support its holding that there is a clearly-mandated public policy in favor 
of  encouraging citizens to rescue others, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals cited 
several Tennessee statutes.  For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-612 absolves 
citizens from criminal liability for using force to rescue a third person when the 
citizen reasonably believes that the intervention is immediately necessary to protect 
the third person.  The court also cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-504 (duress), Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-11-621 (use of  deadly force by a private citizen), and Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 39-17-1322 (defenses to prosecution for an offense against public health, 
safety, and welfare).  According to the court, these statutes show an unambiguous 
legislative intent to pronounce the public policy of  encouraging citizens to rescue a 
person reasonably believed to be in imminent danger of  death or serious bodily 
harm, and to protect a citizen who undertakes such heroic action from negative 
repercussions. 
To the relief  of  employers, the court did not go so far as to adopt a broad 
―Good Samaritan‖ doctrine that would protect all conduct undertaken in aid of  
another.  Rather, the public policy demonstrated in the statutes extends only to 
situations in which the employee took action to rescue or protect another person 
reasonably believed to be in imminent danger of  death or serious bodily harm.  
Additionally, the framework adopted by the court permits the employer to assert the 
defense of  an ―overriding justification‖ for termination.  In Little, the employer 
asserted concerns that the employee‘s behavior could expose them to potential 
liability.  The determination of  whether this potential liability was an overriding 
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justification for dismissal was left to the trial court on remand. 
In summary, absent an overriding justification, employees cannot generally be 
terminated for any reason that violates a clear public policy that is evidenced by an 
unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.  A practitioner should 
keep in mind provisions that encourage and/or protect certain behaviors.  Finally, 
the public policy in favor of  encouraging citizens to rescue others reasonably 
believed to be in imminent danger of  death or serious bodily harm may be the basis 
for an exception to the at-will employment doctrine if  no overriding justification for 
dismissal is present. 
 
 
PROPERTY LAW 
Who Foots the Bill for Moving Utility Lines on Public Rights-of-Way . . . 
Utility Companies or Local Government?  Metro. Gov’t v. Bellsouth Telecom, 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 747 (M.D. Tenn. 2007). 
By Amber Becton 
In Metropolitan Government v. Bellsouth Telecom, the District Court for the Middle 
District of  Tennessee addressed the question of  who bears the burden of  relocating 
utility lines on public rights-of-way.  A municipal government has authority to require 
utility companies to relocate lines and equipment to accommodate public works that 
are reasonably necessary to benefit public welfare. Unless an applicable 
reimbursement statute exists, the cost of  relocating such equipment lies with the 
utility company.  
The Metropolitan Government of  Nashville and Davidson County 
(―Metro‖) provided several municipal functions including maintenance of  public 
properties.  As a result of  Metro‘s Public Square redevelopment project, several 
utility lines needed to be relocated.  These lines were placed and maintained in their 
current location by Bellsouth Telecommunications (―BST‖).  A dispute arose over 
whether Metro or BST was responsible for the costs associated with relocating the 
lines.  BST refused to move the lines and equipment unless Metro agreed to pay, in 
advance, the costs associated with the relocation.  In order to keep the Public Square 
project on schedule, Metro agreed to pay the fees in advance.  Metro then brought 
suit against BST seeking recovery of  the costs to relocate the lines and equipment 
and an injunction and declaration concerning responsibility to relocate utility lines in 
the future.  Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.   
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The threshold issue in this case was which party bore the cost of  relocating 
utility lines and equipment on public rights-of-way.  At common law, a utility bore 
the cost of  relocating from public rights-of-way ―whenever requested to do so by 
state or local authorities.‖  However, an exception existed when the costs were 
otherwise allocated by contract or statute.  Thus, Tennessee requires utilities to bear 
the burden of  relocating utility lines and equipment unless a valid reimbursement 
statute exists.  
Metro asserted that no applicable reimbursement statute existed and that 
BST should bear the relocation cost.  However, BST argued that the Public Square 
project fell within the definition of  a redevelopment project and thus fell under a 
Tennessee reimbursement statute which requires reimbursement for relocation of  
utility lines and equipment necessary to a ―redevelopment or urban renewal project.‖  
The court agreed with BST and held that the reimbursement statute was applicable 
to the Public Square project.  Although the Metro‘s housing authority was not 
directly involved in the planning for the Public Square project, the court determined 
the reimbursement statute still applied because a substantial portion of  the Public 
Square project fell within a redevelopment district and was governed by a 
redevelopment plan.  
Because the relocation was necessary and fell within the development area, 
the court held that Metro was responsible for the costs of  relocating the BST lines 
under the Tennessee reimbursement statute.  Thus, the court denied Metro‘s motion 
for reimbursement for its advance payment to BST for relocation of  the utility lines.  
In addition to reimbursement, Metro sought a permanent injunction barring 
BST from refusing to relocate lines, at BST‘s cost, after a reasonable request from 
Metro.  The court applied a four-factor test to determine whether to grant a 
permanent injunction.  For a permanent injunction to be granted, the plaintiff  must 
prove (1) that he has suffered irreparable injury, (2) that monetary damages are an 
inadequate remedy, (3) that a remedy in equity is warranted, and (4) that an 
injunction is not contrary to public interest.  The court found that Metro did not 
meet its burden of  showing it suffered irreparable injury or lacked an adequate 
remedy.  Thus, the court ruled that a permanent injunction was not warranted. 
Metro also sought a declaration stating BST was required, at its own cost, to 
relocate lines when Metro deemed it necessary absent valid reimbursement statutes.  
The court considered five factors in determining whether to issue a declaration, 
including whether the action would settle the dispute, whether the action would 
clarify a legal issue, and the presence of  a more effective remedy.  The court 
determined that a limited declaration was useful to clarify legal issues between the 
parties in their case given their continued relationship with each other. 
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The court declared that although Tennessee had adopted reimbursement 
statutes allowing utility companies to recover costs associated with relocation, utility 
companies were not permitted to refuse to relocate equipment when a municipality 
reasonably requested.  The court also stated that the utility was not allowed to 
demand payment from the municipality prior to relocating the equipment because 
such demands can unnecessarily delay public works projects.  As such, the burden 
was on the utility company to provide the relocation services and then sue the 
municipality for reimbursement if  the utility felt a statute required reimbursement 
and the municipality refused.  In this instance, BST‘s refusal to relocate the lines until 
they were paid was a violation of  the reimbursement statute even though Metro was 
obligated to pay for the relocation of  the lines.  
BST also argued that the Telecommunications statute gave BST the power to 
refuse to relocate any of  its facilities if  the relocation was a result of  any purpose 
other than to benefit the traveling public.  The court found that this argument was 
without merit and held that a state has the police power to compel utility companies 
to remove lines from public rights-of-way.  This followed the common law rule that a 
utility company‘s use of  public rights-of-way was always subordinate to the rights of  
the public.  
In issuing a declaration on the state of  public utilities law, the court also 
rejected BST‘s argument that the issue of  who bears the cost of  relocation was a 
fact-specific issue that must be determined on an individual basis.  When, as in this 
case, the burden was properly allocated to the municipality, the court determined that 
a declaration was necessary to clarify Metro and BST‘s legal relationship and to 
prevent future disputes.  Therefore, the court issued a declaration. 
For transactional lawyers in Tennessee, those representing municipalities, and 
those representing utility companies, this case provides a statement of  the law 
regarding who bears the burden of  relocation. It also reinforces the right of  the 
municipality to exercise its police power to require utilities to relocate equipment 
from public rights-of-way when doing so is necessary to benefit the public welfare.  
Where relocation of  utilities is likely to be in dispute, the transactional lawyer should 
advise clients that the initial cost of  relocation lies on the utility company, which has 
a right to be reimbursed for such expenses if  a reimbursement statute applies to the 
situation.  If  a municipality fails to reimburse the utility, then the burden is on the 
utility to sue for reimbursement.  
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SECURITIES REGULATION 
Securities Law Implicitly Precludes Antitrust Claims.  Credit Suisse Securities 
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). 
By Stephen D. Hargraves 
What legal remedies are available to buyers of  newly issued securities, where 
the underwriters have allegedly undertaken coordinated efforts to collect excessive 
commissions through unlawful practices, including laddering, tying, and pledges 
regarding later sales of  the issued shares?  In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. 
Billing, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
securities law precludes claims stemming from such antitrust law violations. 
In Credit Suisse, the underwriting practices at issue took place during the 
course of  an initial public offering (―IPO‖) of  shares in a company.  In conjunction 
with the IPO, ten investment banks (―petitioners‖) formed a syndicate to market the 
company shares.  After both investigating and estimating the likely market demand 
for the shares at various prices, the petitioners agreed to buy all the newly issued 
shares from the issuing firm at a discounted price.  After purchasing the shares, the 
petitioners then resold them at an increased price to investors.  Traditionally, this 
increased resale price of  the shares over the discounted syndicate price amounts to 
the syndicate‘s commission.  
However, according to the IPO investors, the petitioners unlawfully agreed 
that the syndicate would not sell shares of  the IPO to a prospective buyer unless that 
buyer committed (1) to buy additional shares of  the IPO at escalating prices 
(―laddering‖), (2) to purchase from the petitioners other less desirable securities 
(―tying‖ arrangements), and (3) to pay unusually high commissions on subsequent 
offerings from the petitioners (―pledging‖).  These alleged marketing activities 
amounted to additional charges over and above the petitioners‘ traditional IPO 
commissions.  Moreover, the investors alleged that the concerted efforts of  the 
petitioners artificially inflated the share prices of  the securities in question.  
In January 2002, a group of  sixty investors brought class-action lawsuits 
against the underwriting firms, alleging that the firms violated antitrust laws by 
engaging in laddering, tying, and the collection of  excessively high commissions.  
The petitioners moved to dismiss the investors‘ complaints on the ground that 
federal securities law impliedly precluded application of  antitrust laws to the conduct 
in question.  In agreement with the motion, the United States Court for the Southern 
District of  New York dismissed the action.  On appeal, the Court of  Appeals for the 
Second Circuit vacated the lower court‘s decision and remanded the actions to the 
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lower court.  
In Credit Suisse, the United States Supreme Court noted that where regulatory 
statutes, such as securities law, are silent with respect to antitrust, courts must 
determine whether, and in what respects, the regulatory statutes preclude the 
antitrust laws‘ application.  In previous decisions specifically addressing the relation 
of  securities law to antitrust law, the Court made clear that §§ 77p(a) and 78bb(a) 
may not be interpreted as savings clauses so broad as to preserve all antitrust actions.  
In determining the preclusion issue, the Court must apply a ―clearly incompatible‖ 
standard in concluding whether the antitrust complaint may coexist with securities 
law.  Under this standard, to warrant an implication of  preclusion, the following 
criteria must be present:  (1) the existence of  regulatory authority under the securities 
law to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory 
entities exercises that authority; (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust 
laws, if  both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, 
privileges, or standards of  conduct; and (4) the possible conflict affects practices that 
lie squarely within an area of  financial market activity.  
Applying each of  the foregoing criteria to the facts in Credit Suisse, the Court 
found that the respondents could not reasonably dispute the existence of  several of  
the conditions necessary in determining implied preclusion.  First, general marketing 
efforts, such as road shows and book-building efforts, to promote and sell securities 
during the IPO process are considered by financial experts, as well as securities 
regulators, as essential to the successful marketing of  an IPO.  As such, the 
petitioners‘ general marketing practices qualify as lying squarely within an area of  
financial market activity.  
Second, under securities law, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(―SEC‖) enjoys the legal authority to forbid, permit, encourage, discourage, tolerate, 
limit, and otherwise regulate virtually all aspects of  the IPO marketing process.  
Additionally, private individuals may recover damages for harm resulting from 
securities law violations.  As a result, regulatory authority exists under securities law 
to supervise the IPO marketing activities exercised in the instant case.  
Third, the Court noted that the SEC has continuously exercised its legal 
authority to supervise the IPO marketing efforts at issue.  One example of  such 
involvement in this area of  financial market activity can be seen in the SEC‘s detailed 
definitions stating how underwriters, such as the petitioners, may interact with 
customers during road shows.  Moreover, the SEC has brought actions against 
underwriters who violate SEC regulations relating to marketing activities.  Therefore, 
the Court found satisfactory evidence that the responsible regulatory entity, the SEC, 
exercises its authority.  
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Given that the first, second, and fourth criteria for finding implied preclusion 
had been easily satisfied, the Court focused its attention on the last, more 
complicated, question:  is the antitrust claim presented in the instant case likely to 
prove practically incompatible with the SEC‘s administration of  the securities laws?  
The Court determined that while the SEC has disapproved the conduct that the 
antitrust complaints attack, seemingly obviating any conflict between the two bodies 
of  law, other considerations led the Court to find that simultaneous application of  
securities law and antitrust law would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, 
duties, privileges, or standards of  conduct.  
First, a fine, complex line separates activity that the SEC permits from 
activity that it forbids.  As such, evidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity 
and evidence tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap, or 
prove identical.  This blurred demarcation of  legally permissible activities, coupled 
with the possibility of  antitrust plaintiffs bringing lawsuits in dozens of  different 
courts with different non-expert judges and non-expert juries, would open the door 
to widely different legal results.  Therefore, the threat of  likely antitrust mistakes and 
inconsistencies, and the resulting unpredictability of  what may constitute legally 
permissible marketing activities, could alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways.  
As a result, antitrust lawsuits would threaten serious harm to the efficient 
functioning of  the securities markets. 
Furthermore, in determining whether antitrust law and securities laws may 
coexist, the Court found that the enforcement-related need for an antitrust lawsuit is 
unusually small, given the active involvement of  the SEC in this arena.  Together, the 
potential harm to the securities markets and the small need for antitrust lawsuits in 
this particular sphere indicate that a serious conflict exists, satisfying the third criteria 
for finding implied preclusion.  Consequently, the Court reversed the Second 
Circuit‘s decision, holding that the securities laws are ―clearly incompatible‖ with the 
application of  the antitrust laws in the instant case. 
Although the petitioners‘ joint efforts to collect ―excessive‖ commissions 
could be independently viewed as violations of  antitrust laws, the Court‘s holding in 
Credit Suisse resolved that where such activities are governed by securities law, those 
statutory regulations implicitly preclude the application of  antitrust laws.  A 
transactional lawyer should advise underwriters of  newly issued securities that their 
marketing activities, with regard to such securities, are effectively immune from 
claims arising out of  antitrust violations.  In addition, a transactional lawyer should 
advise investors in newly issued securities that any suffered damages stemming from 
marketing activities, such as laddering and tying, may only be remedied under 
securities law.  Failure to file a claim limited to securities law violations will result in 
the claim‘s dismissal on a motion for summary judgment. 
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Requirements for Pleading “Strong Inference” of  Scienter in a Private Action 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
By Taylor Williams 
The Securities Exchange Act of  1934 provides individuals with a private right 
of  action to enforce federal antifraud securities laws.  To prevent the flood and abuse 
of  private litigation in this area, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of  1995 (the ―PSLRA‖ or the ―Act‖).  One safeguard included in § 
21D(b)(2) of  this Act requires plaintiffs bringing such an action to include in the 
complaint each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and any facts giving rise to a ―strong inference‖ of  scienter.  
Scienter exists if  the defendant acted with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud investors.  However, in enacting the PSLRA, Congress failed to address the 
requirements or definition of  the term ―strong inference.‖  After differing 
interpretations of  ―strong inference‖ appeared among the circuits, the Supreme 
Court resolved the dispute by establishing the meaning ―strong inference‖ in Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.  The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff  must set 
forth sufficient, specific facts to create an ―inference of  scienter . . . more than 
merely plausible or reasonable – it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference of  nonfraudulent intent.‖ 
In Tellabs, investors who purchased Tellabs‘s stock between December 11, 
2000, and June 19, 2001 (―Shareholders‖), accused Tellabs and its chief  executive 
officer, Richard Notebaert, (collectively the ―Defendants‖) of  ―engaging in a scheme 
to deceive the investing public about the true value of  Tellabs‘[s] stock.‖  The 
Shareholders pointed to four particular acts by Defendants between December 2000 
and spring 2001 that misled the investing public into purchasing Tellabs‘s stock.  
First, Notebaert indicated that demand for Tellabs‘s flagship product was increasing 
when in fact, demand was waning.  Second, Notebaert indicated that Tellabs‘s new 
flagship product was ready for production and demand for the product was high, 
though neither statement was true.  Third, Defendants falsely represented Tellabs‘s 
financial results for the fourth quarter of  2000.  Fourth, Defendants overstated 
projected future revenue streams based on false demand projections of  Tellabs‘s 
products.  Over the next few months, the poor performance of  Tellabs‘s products 
slowly became apparent to the public and ultimately culminated on June 19, 2001, 
when Tellabs disclosed significantly lower demand projections for its flagship 
product.  As a result, the company lowered its revenue projections, causing the 
company‘s stock to plunge from $67 to $15.87 a share. 
Shortly after Tellabs‘s stock plummeted, the Shareholders filed a class action 
in the District Court of  Illinois.  The complaint stated that Defendants ―had engaged 
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in securities fraud in violation of  § 10(b) of  the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5 [and] that Notebaert was a ‗controlling person‘ under § 20(a) of  the 
1934 Act and therefore derivatively liable for the company‘s fraudulent acts‖ 
(citations omitted).  Following a motion by the Defendants, the district court held 
that the Shareholders had not pleaded their case with particularity as required by the 
PSLRA, and dismissed the complaint without prejudice.  In response, the 
Shareholders amended their complaint to include specific references to twenty-seven 
confidential sources in an attempt to show the existence of  Notebaert‘s scienter.  
After considering the new references, the district court determined that Notebaert‘s 
statements were misleading; however, the Shareholders had still failed to plead with 
sufficient particularity that Notebaert had acted with scienter.  The complaint was 
again dismissed, but this time it was dismissed with prejudice. 
Upon the second dismissal, the Shareholders appealed the decision to the 
Seventh Circuit Court of  Appeals.  The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Shareholders 
had sufficiently pleaded that Notebaert‘s acts were misleading, but unlike the district 
court, the court of  appeals concluded that the complaint created a ―strong 
inference‖ of  Notebaert‘s scienter.  In making this determination, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that a complaint will survive ―if  it alleges facts from which, if  true, 
a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.‖  
The Seventh Circuit adopted this rather lax standard for pleading out of  fear that a 
stricter standard would violate the Shareholder‘s Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial.  This interpretation created a stark disagreement between the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits as to pleading requirements to establish a ―strong inference‖ of  scienter.  
The Sixth Circuit required plaintiffs to plead the requisite scienter with such 
particularity that no other competing inferences could plausibly be drawn.  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this disagreement among 
circuits. 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court first looked at the legislative 
intent behind § 21D(b)(2) of  the PSLRA, which requires heightened pleading for 
private actions under the securities fraud laws.  In enacting the PSLRA, Congress 
adopted the Second Circuit‘s ―strong inference‖ language to describe the standard 
for pleading such actions.  However, Congress did not adopt the Second Circuit‘s 
interpretation of  ―strong inference.‖  As a result, the Supreme Court left great 
leeway in defining the term.  In Tellabs, the Supreme Court set forth to establish a 
standard of  pleading which would promote the two goals of  the PSLRA:  ―to curb 
frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors‘ ability to recover on 
meritorious claims.‖ 
In determining the level required to create a ―strong inference,‖ the Supreme 
Court stated that a court must take into account all plausible opposing inferences in 
deciding scienter.  The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit had not done this 
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because it only applied a ―reasonable person‖ standard, which failed to take into 
consideration any other inferences.  The Court held that while a ―reasonable person‖ 
standard does create an inference of  scienter, it fails to create a ―strong inference‖ of  
scienter.  A court must look to all ―plausible nonculpable explanations‖ for the 
defendant‘s conduct.  Accordingly, a ―complaint will survive . . . only if  a reasonable 
person would deem the inference of  scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.‖  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court found that the Shareholders had pointed to questionable actions on the part 
of  the Defendants, but the Shareholders had failed to set forth unambiguous 
circumstances, which would unequivocally indicate an inference of  scienter. 
Importantly, Tellabs sets forth the standard for pleading securities fraud 
violations under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 § 10(b).  Any attorney wishing 
to bring such an action must plead with particularity:  (1) the specific statements or 
acts of  deception and why they were misleading and (2) facts creating a ―strong 
inference‖ of  scienter.  To create a ―strong inference,‖ the plaintiff  must set forth 
enough specific allegations so that the inference of  the existence of  scienter is at 
least as strong as any other opposing inference.  As a result, an attorney could either 
set forth facts proving scienter or set forth facts disproving all other possible mental 
states or motives for the misleading acts.  Although this holding does not require a 
plaintiff  to prove the inference of  scienter in the most plausible manner, the 
challenge of  proving that the inference of  scienter is as likely as any other opposing 
inference will be a significant obstacle for a plaintiff  alleging securities fraud 
violations under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934 § 10(b). 
 
 
TAX LAW 
If  Title Ownership Is Unclear, Attorneys Must Send Notice To Every 
Possible Owner.  Keisler v. Wallace, No. E2006-00276-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2007).  
By Martha McRee 
Keisler v. Wallace demonstrates that lawyers must find the correct title holders 
of  property and ensure adequate notice is given to these individuals to complete a 
valid tax sale.   The result in Keisler v. Wallace depended on whether there was 
common ownership of  property in Campbell County, Tennessee.  The Tennessee 
Court of  Appeals determined that there was a genuine issue of  material fact as to 
whether there was common ownership of  this property, and, because ownership was 
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unclear, it was also unclear whether notice was adequate.   
Mr. Keisler filed a complaint to quiet title to and partition 600 acres of  land 
in Campbell County.  Keisler successfully purchased this property from all but one 
of  the heirs of  Z.D. Baird.  However, he did not own the underlying mineral rights 
on the land.  Campbell County owned the mineral rights.  Campbell County 
purchased these rights at a tax sale that was held when taxes dues on the mineral 
rights were not paid for several years.  These tax notices were sent to Lendon Baird.   
Keisler sought to set aside the tax sale, arguing that his predecessors in 
interest, the heirs of  Z.D. Baird, and the individual who received notice, Lendon 
Baird, did not have common ownership of  the property.  Without common 
ownership, the notice sent to Lendon Baird was inadequate. 
Several deeds pertained to the property at issue.  First, a 1920 deed 
documented the conveyance of  three tracts of  land to Z.D. Baird.  These three tracts 
are the same 600 acres owned by Keisler.  In addition, a 1921 deed documented the 
conveyance to Z.D. Baird of  property identical to the third tract included in the 1920 
deed.  However, there was also a different and separate line of  title that appeared to 
describe the same property.  A 1964 deed documented a conveyance of  a portion of  
four tracts of  land from heirs of  Winston Baird to Lendon Baird.  Three of  these 
tracts are those described in the 1920 deed to Z.D. Baird.  These appeared to be the 
same 600 acres now owned by Keisler.  To complicate things further, the sole 
surviving heir of  Lendon Baird conveyed her interest in the combined four tracts to 
Bart Montanari.  Montanari filed a successful motion to intervene. 
The central issue in the case was whether there was commonality of  
ownership between the heirs of  Z.D. Baird and the heirs of  Winston Baird to 
support a joint assessment of  taxes and a sale when the taxes were not paid.  The 
plaintiff  argued there was not a commonality of  ownership; therefore, the notice was 
not sufficient.  Campbell County argued there was joint ownership of  the property, 
and thus the notice was sufficient and the county legally owned the mineral rights.  
The court of  appeals determined that a genuine issue of  material fact remained and 
vacated the grant of  summary judgment.    
Previously, the Tennessee Supreme Court had stated that a taxpayer must be 
before the court by actual or constructive service of  process for a valid suit to collect 
delinquent taxes.  This taxpayer must be the proper title owner of  the property.  
When a taxpayer is not properly before the court, the sale is a nullity to him and it 
can be attacked at any time.  Furthermore, if  the tax sale is void, the statute of  
limitations providing a three year limit to challenge a tax sale does not apply. 
Keisler argued that the tax assessment and sale of  the mineral rights were 
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invalid for two reasons.  First, the county did not have the authority to combine 
property owned by Z.D. Baird and his successors with property owned by Winston 
Baird and his successors.  According to Keisler, there was no evidence to support a 
finding that the two parties jointly owned the property.  Second, the heirs of  Z.D. 
Baird from whom Keisler acquired the property did not receive sufficient notice 
because notice was only sent to Lendon Baird. 
Campbell County and Montanari disagreed and claimed that several items in 
the record established commonality of  ownership in the four tracts.  These items 
included a copy of  the final settlement of  the estate of  Z.D. Baird, a complaint filed 
in the trial court by the heirs of  Z.D. Baird, and a copy of  a 1988 court of  appeals 
opinion.  Campbell County and Montanari asserted that these items supported a 
finding that the heirs of  Z.D. Baird and the heirs of  Winston Baird co-owned the 
four tracts of  land.   
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals determined that it was clear the Baird 
family owned a large amount of  land in Campbell County at some point in time.  In 
addition, the heirs of  Z.D. Baird and the heirs of  Winston Baird jointly owned some 
800 or 900 acres.  However, there was no definitive answer about whether the 800 or 
900 acres owned jointly by the heirs of  Z.D. and Winston Baird included the 600 
acres that were the subject of  this lawsuit.  Thus, a genuine issue of  material fact 
existed as to whether there was joint ownership and consequently adequate notice.   
This case is very important for transactional lawyers, particularly real estate 
lawyers.  Lawyers should ensure that they verify all of  the owners of  property to 
whom they send tax assessments.  If  ownership is unclear, notice should be sent to 
all potential owners.  In addition, lawyers should complete a thorough title search to 
ensure that the land to be purchased includes any underlying mineral rights.   
 
 
WILLS AND ESTATES 
Illegitimate and Omitted Children Can No Longer Arrange Their “Legal 
Birth” to Avoid the Established Rules of  Will and Statutory Construction. 
Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656 (Tenn. 2007). 
By Emily Cleveland 
The failure of  a testator to explicitly disinherit any known or unknown 
children can significantly complicate the probate process and may cause the testator 
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to risk judicial interpretation that runs contrary to the testator‘s intent.  In Lanier v. 
Rains, the Tennessee Supreme Court was forced to decide if  a child, born before the 
testator executed his will but legitimized after, qualified as a pretermitted heir under 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-103 and was thus entitled to a share of  the estate.  With the 
widespread availability and use of  sophisticated paternity tests today, the holding of  
the Court has significant implications, because it is now scientifically possible to 
extract DNA from a deceased testator and determine paternity posthumously.  
Dexter Rains (the ―Decedent‖) died on July 30, 2004.  Less than three weeks 
later the only named beneficiaries in the Decedent‘s will, his wife and son 
(―Beneficiaries‖), filed a petition to admit the will into probate.  The Decedent had 
executed his will on June 30, 1998, and his estate included, among other assets, a 
bank and insurance agency.  After the will was approved for probate, Elizabeth 
Lanier (―Lanier‖) filed suit to establish paternity and simultaneously filed a claim for 
a one-third share of  the estate under the pretermitted child statute.  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-103 protects a pretermitted child born after the making 
of  a will, by providing that a child, ―born after the making of  a will, either before or 
after the death of  the testator, . . . not provided for nor disinherited . . . shall succeed 
to the same portion of  the testator‘s estate as if  the testator had died intestate.‖  
Lanier, born December 23, 1961–almost forty-three years before the Decedent‘s 
death and thirty-seven years before his will was executed–claimed the Decedent was 
her biological father.  However, during his lifetime, the Decedent never supported 
Lanier nor sought a declaration of  legitimization and made no mention of  Lanier in 
his will.  However, to support her claim that she should be considered ―born after 
the making of  the will,‖ Lanier relied on the unreported opinion from the case Rose v. 
Stalcup, No. 140, 1988 WL 69501 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 1988), where the Tennessee 
Court of  Appeals held that the ―legal birth‖ date for the purposes of  Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 32-3-103 was established on the date of  a judicial decree of  paternity or 
legitimization, regardless of  the actual birth date of  the claimant. 
The Beneficiaries had no personal knowledge of  whether the Decedent was 
Lanier‘s biological father, but admitted that during the Decedent‘s lifetime, the 
Decedent knew that Lanier claimed she was his daughter.  To defend Lanier‘s claims, 
the Beneficiaries challenged the propriety of  the Rose opinion and argued that, under 
the plain language of  the statute, Lanier did not qualify as being ―born after the 
making of  the will.‖  Additionally, the Beneficiaries asserted that even if  Rose applied, 
the Decedent had implicitly disinherited Lanier by the terms of  his will.  
The chancellor granted the Beneficiaries‘ motion to dismiss and observed 
that ―the Legislature never intended to allow the court to birth children by 
legitimization and use this fiction to place them within the meaning of  the 
pretermitted child‘s statute.‖  The chancellor concluded that the Decedent knew 
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Lanier might be his daughter, and based on the ruling in In re Estate of  Eden, 99 
S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), where the court held that a testator who specifically 
left his property to named individuals disinherited his other heirs by implication, 
Lanier was not entitled to inherit from Decedent.  The court of  appeals affirmed the 
chancellor‘s judgment, specifically declined to follow the holding in Rose, and ruled 
that Lanier did not qualify as a pretermitted heir.  Lanier appealed to the Tennessee 
Supreme Court. 
Following the applicable standard of  review, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
noted that because all allegations of  fact must be taken as true, the court had to 
assume that the Decedent was Lanier‘s biological father.  Next, applying the rules of  
statutory construction to interpret the pretermitted heir statute, the court looked to 
the legislature‘s intent in passing the statute.  The Tennessee General Assembly 
enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-105 to combine the separate paternity and 
legitimization statutes and define the parent-child relationship.  The statute provides 
that an action to establish the paternity of  a child can be brought before or after the 
birth of  the child and until three years after the child reaches the age of  majority.  
However, the statute provides an exception if  the statute is being invoked to 
determine inheritance through intestate succession.  If  such a situation exists, a 
person born out of  wedlock is a child of  the mother and also a child of  the father if: 
(1) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of  the father or 
(2) is established after the death of  the father by clear and convincing proof.  Interpreting 
this statute, the court has held that a child born out of  wedlock, whose paternity was 
not established before the father died, can still establish the right to inherit by 
intestate succession if  that right is asserted within the applicable statute of  
limitations and the child establishes paternity by clear and convincing evidence.  
The first issues addressed by the Tennessee Supreme Court was whether the 
holding of  Rose was binding in this case and whether it was appropriate for a child 
legitimatized after a decedent‘s death to qualify under the pretermitted heir statute.  
Agreeing with the court of  appeals, the court declined to follow Rose and rejected 
Lanier‘s argument that her ―legal birth‖ occurred at the time of  legitimization, and 
therefore after her father wrote his will.  Agreeing with the Beneficiaries and 
applying a central concept of  probate law, the court noted that statute was designed 
to effectuate the actual intent of  the testator by supplying an ―omitted intention on 
behalf  of  after born children inadvertently excluded.‖  Following the rules of  statutory 
construction, the court declined to force its own interpretation into the term born.  
Because the legislature expressed no intent to allow a liberal construction of  the 
word ―born,‖ the court held Lanier was simply not born after the will was written.  
Additionally, the court concluded that even if  Lanier was considered legally 
born after the will was written, she was not a pretermitted heir because she was 
disinherited by implication.  Because pretermitted means an unintentional omission, 
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the court reasoned that the purpose of  Tennessee‘s pretermitted heir statute was to 
prevent the unintentional disinheritance of  an unborn child who was clearly not within 
the contemplation of  the testator at the time the will was written.  If  the testator 
intended to omit the child from the will, the pretermitted heir statute is inapplicable, 
regardless of  whether the child is legitimate, born out of  wedlock, or adopted.  The 
pretermitted heir statute only operates when the testator‘s intention is not expressed 
or is not necessarily implied from the will.  As a final blow to Lanier‘s argument that 
the pretermitted heir statute applied, the court chastised Lanier‘s attempt to 
manipulate the statute to circumvent the Decedent‘s intent.  The court concluded 
that because the Decedent was fully aware of  his relationship to Lanier and made no 
effort to adopt or formally legitimize her after executing his will, Lanier was 
disinherited, ―by implication so . . . that no intention to the contrary could be 
supposed.‖  
Finally, court explicitly overruled Rose.  Not only did Rose misapply Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 32-3-103, but an adherence to that ruling would allow a child born out 
of  wedlock and omitted from a will to orchestrate his ―legal birth‖ and avoid the 
established rules of  will and statutory construction.   
The Lanier case serves to remind probate attorneys of  an important theme 
reiterated throughout probate case law. Simply executing a will does not guarantee 
that disinherited beneficiaries will not challenge the will.  When drafting a will, an 
attorney needs to exercise the upmost care to ensure that anyone the testator does 
not desire to provide for is explicitly disinherited.  It is the job of  the drafting attorney 
to probe deep into the testator‘s life to determine who the potential heirs are and 
who might challenge the will.  While admitting an extra-marital affair or illegitimate 
child might have been embarrassing for the Decedent in this case, had the drafting 
attorney included a clause explicitly disinheriting Lanier, someone almost guaranteed 
to challenge the will, this costly, time-consuming, and embarrassing litigation could 
have been avoided.     
 
A Presumption of  Undue Influence Arises Where One Possessing an 
Unrestricted Power of  Attorney, Both Executes Such Power and Benefits from 
Transactions Involving the Deceased's Funds.  Basham v. Duffer, 238 S.W.3d 304 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).  
By Russ Blair  
In Tennessee, a normal relationship between a mentally competent parent 
and adult child, with or without powers of  attorney, does not constitute a per se 
confidential relationship, nor does it raise a presumption of  impropriety or undue 
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influence.  In fact, assertions of  undue influence in a relationship between an elderly 
parent and adult child with no powers of  attorney must be supported by evidence of  
coercion, fraud, deception, or clear dominion over the will of  the elderly parent.  On 
the other hand, where the adult child is acting as an attorney-in-fact, a confidential 
relationship is established where the agent having powers of  attorney, executes such 
power to his or her own benefit.  Consequently, only clear and convincing evidence 
of  the fairness of  the transactions will rebut the confidential relationship 
presumption.   
In Basham v. Duffer, the Appellants, serving as the decedent‘s attorneys-in-fact 
brought a lawsuit against three persons previously responsible for taking care of  the 
decedent prior to her death.  The decedent, Estelle Ray, was an elderly widow of  
minimal education who had been completely dependent upon her husband Fred Ray 
in all financial and business affairs during his life.  Upon Mr. Ray‘s death, the frugal 
couple owned a small farm and home, a car, and had amassed nearly $200,000 in 
joint bank accounts.  While Mrs. Ray remained competent following her husband‘s 
death, she first relinquished control of  her business affairs and bill-payment to her 
eldest step-son Martin Ray without appointing him power-of-attorney.  Martin 
proceeded to withdraw significant sums of  money and, after being gifted Fred Ray‘s 
Ford vehicle by Mrs. Ray, subsequently sold it back to the decedent for $2,500.  
Six months later, Mrs. Ray appointed her other two stepchildren, Diane and 
James, her attorneys in fact.  During the twenty-two months that Diane and James 
served as the decedent‘s attorneys-in-fact, Diane received approximately $36,000 and 
James received $48,110 in respective gifts from Mrs. Ray‘s coffers.  Also during this 
time, Mrs. Ray sold the farm and home to her neighbor for $84,000, but retained a 
life estate in the house.  The Appellants further alleged that while holding the Mrs. 
Ray‘s power of  attorney, Diane and James ―drained the account‖ into which the 
proceeds from the home sale were deposited.   
Nearly two years after appointing Diane and James as attorneys-in-fact, Mrs. 
Ray executed yet another power of  attorney appointing the Appellants, Ray‘s niece 
and grandson, as her attorneys-in-fact.  By this time, however, Mrs. Ray had only 
$10,000 remaining in her bank accounts.  The Appellants subsequently filed a 
Complaint on Mrs. Ray‘s behalf  alleging that the Appellees unduly misappropriated 
the decedent‘s funds.  The lawsuit was filed six months before Mrs. Ray died from 
complications resulting from a stroke.  By all accounts, the evidence suggested that 
the decedent remained mentally alert and competent until suffering the stroke one 
month prior to her death.  The chancery court dismissed the case, finding no breach 
of  duty by the Appellees and declaring Mrs. Ray competent during the time her 
funds were dissipated.     
On appeal, the Appellants argued that the trial court erred in failing to find 
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that a confidential relationship arose between Mrs. Ray and Martin Ray thereby 
resulting in a presumption of  undue influence and shifting the burden to Martin Ray 
to show the fairness of  the transactions regarding Mrs. Ray‘s funds.  The normal 
relationship between a mentally competent parent and a child is not per se a 
confidential relationship and raises no presumption of  undue influence in the 
absence of  elements of  dominion and control, a showing of  physical and mental 
deterioration of  the donor, evidence of  fraud or undue influence, or other evidence 
indicating that the free agency of  the donor was destroyed and the will of  the donee 
substituted.  Consequently, even where motive or opportunity to exert undue 
influence may exist in a parent-child relationship, the elderly parent‘s avowed 
competence, signatures on checks, and the absence of  specific evidence of  coercion, 
fraud, or deception are fatal to establishing a confidential relationship resulting in a 
presumption of  undue influence.  Thus, the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s 
holding as to Martin Ray where both parties testified as to Mrs. Ray‘s competence at 
the time of  the disbursements and Ray had signed the checks with no evidence of  
coercion or deception.   
Appellants also argued on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to find 
that Diane and James breached a fiduciary duty to Mrs. Ray where they possessed an 
unrestricted power of  attorney.  A presumption of  undue influence arises where the 
possessor of  an unrestricted power of  attorney: (1) executes such power and (2) 
benefits from transactions involving the funds.  This presumption can be rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence of  the fairness of  the transaction.    
In the case of  Appellee James, the record suggested that he had signed 
numerous withdrawal slips on the decedent‘s bank accounts in addition to signing a 
motor vehicle transfer as an exercise of  his power of  attorney.  There was also little 
question as to whether James benefited from the transactions where several of  the 
checks he signed were made out to James and his immediate family.  The appellate 
court found that the trial court erred in failing to recognize the existence of  a 
―confidential relationship‖ which shifted the burden of  proof  to Appellee James.  
Consequently, the appellate court reversed because James failed to satisfy his burden 
when he offered no explanation of  the fairness of  the transactions but simply 
testified that the money used by him had been ―given away‖ by Mrs. Ray or ―used to 
pay bills.‖   
On the other hand, no confidential relationship arose when an unrestricted 
power of  attorney was executed but not exercised by the attorney-in-fact.  Thus, the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s release of  Diane from liability because there 
was no evidence on record that she actually executed any transactions as the Ray‘s 
attorney-in-fact.  Regardless of  the clearly suspicious surface implications 
surrounding the gradual diminution of  Mrs. Ray‘s money, the court was in no 
position to cast doubt on the trial court‘s findings in the absence of  competent 
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evidence and testimony.  Accordingly, the Appellants‘ assertions of  undue influence 
by Diane, without substantial proof, were insufficient to shift the burden of  proof.   
As illustrated by Basham, estate planners, elder law and family law attorneys, 
and general practitioners should be prepared to discuss the implications of  the 
relationship between an elderly parent and an adult child acting as agent.  While such 
normal relationships do not, in and of  themselves, create a confidential relationship 
or raise a presumption of  undue influence, the existence of  an unrestricted power of  
attorney combined with transactions benefiting the ―dominant‖ party creates a 
confidential relationship as a matter of  law.  This creates a presumption of  undue 
influence, which can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of  the 
fairness of  the transactions executed on behalf  of  the principal.  Tennessee 
practitioners must be prepared to offer competent evidence and testimonial proof  
when alleging undue influence by an adult child acting as fiduciary for an elderly 
parent.   
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